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We consider the manipulability of tournament rules for round-robin tournaments of n competitors. Specifi-
cally, n competitors are competing for a prize, and a tournament rule r maps the result of all
(n
2
)
pairwise
matches (called a tournament, T ) to a distribution over winners. Rule r is Condorcet-consistent if whenever
i wins all n− 1 of her matches, r selects i with probability 1.
We consider strategic manipulation of tournaments where player j might throw their match to player
i in order to increase the likelihood that one of them wins the tournament. Regardless of the reason why
j chooses to do this, the potential for manipulation exists as long as Pr[r(T ) = i] increases by more than
Pr[r(T ) = j] decreases. Unfortunately, it is known that every Condorcet-consistent rule is manipulable [Alt-
man and Kleinberg 2010]. In this work, we address the question of how manipulable Condorcet-consistent
rules must necessarily be - by trying to minimize the difference between the increase in Pr[r(T ) = i] and
decrease in Pr[r(T ) = j] for any potential manipulating pair.
We show that every Condorcet-consistent rule is in fact 1/3-manipulable, and that selecting a winner
according to a random single elimination bracket is not α-manipulable for any α > 1/3. We also show that
many previously studied tournament formats are all 1/2-manipulable, and the popular class of Copeland
rules (any rule that selects a player with the most wins) are all in fact 1-manipulable, the worst possible.
Finally, we consider extensions to match-fixing among sets of more than two players.
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, numerous scandals have unfolded surrounding match fixing and
throwing at the highest levels of competitive sports (e.g. Olympic Badminton [Kelso
2012], Professional Tennis [Cox 2016], European Football [Scherer 2015], and even eS-
ports [Sinclair 2015]). In some instances, the motivation behind these scandals was
gambling profits, and no amount of clever tournament design can possibly mitigate
this. In others, however, the surprising motivation was an improved performance at
that same tournament. For instance, four Badminton teams (eight players) were dis-
qualified from the London 2012 Olympics for throwing matches. Interestingly, the rea-
son teams wanted to lose their matches was in order to improve their probability of
winning an Olympic medal. Olympic Badminton (like many other sports) conducts a
two-phase tournament. In the first stage, groups of four play a round-robin tourna-
ment, with the top two teams advancing. In the second stage, the advancing teams
participate in a single elimination tournament, seeded according to their performance
in the group stage. An upset in one group left one of the world’s top teams with a low
seed, so many teams actually preferred to receive a lower seed coming out of the group
stage to face the tougher opponent as late as possible.
While much of the world blames the teams for their poor sportsmanship, researchers
in voting theory have instead critiqued the poor tournament design that punished
teams for trying to maximize their chances of winning a medal. Specifically, the two-
phase tournament lacks the basic property of monotonicity, where no competitor can
unilaterally improve their chances of winning by throwing a match that they otherwise
could have won. Thus, recent work has addressed the question of whether tournament
structures exist that are both fair, in that they select some notion of a qualified winner,
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and strategyproof, in that teams have no incentive to do anything but play their best
in each match.
One minimal notion of fairness studied is Condorcet-consistence, which just guar-
antees that whenever one competitor wins all of their matches (and is what’s called
a Condorcet winner), they win the event with probability 1. Designing Condorcet-
consistent, monotone rules is simple: any single elimination bracket suffices. Popular
voting rules such as the Copeland Rule or the Random Condorcet Removal Rule are
also Condorcet-consistent and monotone, but two-phase tournaments with an initial
group play aren’t [Pauly 2014].
Still, monotonicity only guarantees that no team wishes to unilaterally throw a
match to improve their chances of winning, whereas one might also hope to guarantee
that no two teams could fix the outcome of their match in order to improve the proba-
bility that one of them wins. While we have to go back further in history to find a clear
instance of this kind of match-fixing, it did indeed result in a historical scandal. In the
1982 FIFA World Cup (again a two-stage tournament), Austria, West Germany, and
Algeria were in the same group of four where two would advance. Algeria had already
won two matches and lost one, Austria was 2-0, West Germany was 1-1, and the only
remaining game was Austria vs. West Germany. Due to tie-breakers and the specific
outcomes of previous matches, Austria would have been eliminated by a large West
German victory, and West Germany would have been eliminated by a loss or draw.
Once West Germany scored an early goal, both teams essentially threw the rest of the
match, allowing both of them to advance at Algeria’s expense [Smyth 2014]. While the
incident was never formally investigated, many fans were confident the teams had col-
luded beforehand, and the event is remembered as the “disgrace of Gijo´n.” Before being
eliminated, Algeria had become the first African team to beat a European team at the
World Cup, and also the first to win two games. West Germany went on to become the
runners-up of the tournament.
Motivated by events like this, it is important also to design tournaments where no
two teams can fix the outcome of their match and improve the probability that one
of them wins. Altman and Kleinberg terms this property 2-Strongly Nonmanipulable
(2-SNM), and showed that no tournament rule is both Condorcet-consistent and 2-
SNM [Altman and Kleinberg 2010] (it was previously shown by Altman et. al. that no
deterministic rule is both Condorcet-consistent and 2-SNM [Altman et al. 2009]).
In light of this, both works relax the notion of Condorcet-consistency and design
tournament rules that are at least non-imposing (could possibly select each competitor
as a winner) and 2-SNM [Altman et al. 2009], or α-Condorcet-consistent (if there is a
Condorcet winner, she wins with probability at least α) and 2-SNM. While these relax-
ations are well-motivated for settings where pair-wise comparisons are only implicitly
made, and not even necessarily learned in the end (e.g. elections), it is hard to imagine
a successful sports competition format where a competitor could win all their matches
and still leave empty handed.
Motivated by match-based applications such as sporting events, where the outcome
of pair-wise matches is explicitly learned and used to select a winner, we consider in-
stead the design of tournament rules that are exactly Condorcet-consistent, but only
approximately 2-SNM. Specifically, we say that a tournament rule is 2-SNM-α if it is
never possible for two teams i and j to fix their match such that the probability that
the winner is in {i, j} improves by at least α. The idea behind this relaxation is that
whatever motivates j to throw the match (perhaps j and i are teammates, perhaps i is
paying j some monetary bribe, etc.), the potential gains scale with α. So it is easier to
disincentivize manipulation (either through investigations and punishments, reputa-
tion, or just feeling morally lousy) in tournaments that are less manipulable.
1.1. Our Results
Our main result is a matching upper and lower bound of 1/3 on attainable values of α
for Condorcet-consistent 2-SNM-α tournament rules. The optimal rule that attains this
upper bound is actually quite simple: a random single elimination bracket. Specifically,
each competitor is randomly placed into one of 2dlog2 ne seeds, along with 2dlog2 ne − n
byes, and then a single elimination tournament is played.
Proving a lower bound of 1/3 is straight-forward: imagine a tournament with three
players, A,B and C, where A beats B, B beats C, and C beats A. Then some pair must
win with combined probability at most 2/3. Yet, any pair could create a Condorcet win-
ner by colluding, who necessarily wins with probability 1 in any Condorcet-consistent
rule. Embedding this within examples for arbitrary n is also easy: just have A, B, and
C each beat all of the remaining n− 3 competitors4.
On the other hand, proving that a random single elimination bracket is optimal is
tricky, but our proof is still rather clean. For any i, j in any tournament, we directly
show that i can improve her probability of winning by at most 1/3 when j throws
their match using a coupling argument. For every deterministic single elimination
bracket where i and j could potentially gain from manipulation (because iwould be the
champion if i beat j, but j would not be the champion even if j beat i), we construct two
deterministic single elimination brackets where no potential exists (possibly because
one of them will lose before facing each other, or because the winner would be in {i, j}
no matter the outcome of their match). For our coupling to be valid, we not only need
each mapping to be invertible, but also for their images to be disjoint. Our coupling
is necessarily somewhat involved in order to obtain this property, but otherwise we
believe our proof is likely as simple as possible. Because the probability that j wins
cannot possibly go up by throwing a match to i, this immediately proves that a random
single elimination bracket is 2-SNM-1/3.
We also show that the Copeland rule, a popular rule that chooses the team with the
most wins, is asymptotically 2-SNM-1, the worst possible. Essentially, the problem is
that if all teams have the same number of wins, then any two can collude to guarantee
that one of them wins, no matter the tie-breaking rule. We further show that numerous
other formats, (the Random Voting Caterpillar, the Iterative Condorcet Rule, and the
Top Cycle Rule) are all at best 2-SNM-1/2. The same example is bad for all three
formats: there is one superman who beats n − 2 of the remaining players, and one
kryptonite, who beats only the superman (but loses to the other n− 2 players).
Our results extend to settings where the winner of each pairwise match is not de-
terministically known, but randomized (i.e. all partipants know that i will beat j
with probability pij). Specifically, we show that any rule that is 2-SNM-α when all
pij ∈ {0, 1} is also 2-SNM-α for arbitrary pij . Clearly, any lower bound using integral
pij also provides a lower bound for arbitrary pij , so as far as upper/lower bounds are
concerned the models are equivalent. Of course, the randomized model is much more
realistic, so it is convenient that we can prove theorems in this setting by only studying
the deterministic setting, which is mathematically much simpler.
Finally, we consider manipulations among coalitions of k > 2 participants. We say
that a rule is k-SNM-α if no set S of size ≤ k can ever manipulate the outcomes of
matches between players in S to improve the probability that the winner is in S by
more than α. We prove a simple lower bound of α = k−12k−1 on all Condorcet-consistent
rules, and conjecture that this is tight.
4Interestingly, this lower-bound example is far from pathological and occurs at even the highest levels of
professional sports (see [Phillips 2011], for instance).
1.2. Related Works
The mathematical study of tournament design has a rich literature, ranging from so-
cial choice theory to psychology. The overarching goal in these works is to design tour-
nament rules that satisfy various properties a designer might find desirable. Examples
of such properties might be that all players are treated equally, that a winner is chosen
without a tiebreaking procedure, or that a “most qualified” winner is selected [Dutta
1988; Fishburn 1977; Moulin 1986; Rivest and Shen 2010; Rubinstein 1980; Schwartz
1990; Young 1975]. See [Laslier 1997] for a good review of this literature and its con-
nections to other fields as well.
Most related to our work are properties involving strategic manipulation. In the
more general field of Voting Theory, there is a rich literature on the design of strate-
gyproof mechanisms dating back to Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem [Arrow 1950] and
the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [Gibbard 1973, 1977; Satterthwaite 1975]. While
tournaments are a very special case (voters are indifferent among outcomes where
they do not win, voters can only “lie” in specific ways, etc.), tournament design indeed
seems to inherit much of the impossibility associated with strategyproof voting proce-
dures [Altman and Kleinberg 2010], [Altman et al. 2009].
Specifically, Altman et. al. proved that no deterministic tournament rule is 2-SNM
and Condorcet-consistent, and Altman and Kleinberg proved that no randomized tour-
nament rule is 2-SNM and Condorcet-consistent either [Altman and Kleinberg 2010;
Altman et al. 2009]. More recently, Pauly studied the specific two-stage tournament
rule used by the World Cup (and Olympic Badminton, etc.) [Pauly 2014]. There, it is
shown essentially that the problem lies in the first round group stage: no changes to
the second phase can possibly result in a strategyproof 5 tournament.
To cope with their impossibility results, Altman et. al. propose a relaxation of
Condorcet-consistence called non-imposing. A rule r is non-imposing if for all i, there
exists a T such that player iwins with probability 1. They design a clever recursive rule
that is non-imposing and 2-SNM for all n 6= 3. Interestingly, they also show that for
n = 3 no such rule exists. Altman and Kleinberg consider a different relaxation called
α-Condorcet-consistent. A rule r is α-Condorcet-consistent if whenever i is a Condorcet
winner in T , we have their probability of winning T is at least α. They design a rule
that is 2/n-Condorcet-consistent and 2-SNM (in fact it is also k-SNM for all k), but
conjecture that much better is attainable.
The two works above are most similar to ours in spirit: motivated by the non-
existence of Condorcet-consistent and 2-SNM tournament rules, we relax one of the
notions. These previous works relax Condorcet-consistency while maintaining 2-SNM
exactly, and are most appropriate in settings where pairwise comparisons of players
are only learned implicitly (or perhaps not at all) through the outcome and not ex-
plicitly as the result of matches. Instead, we relax the notion of 2-SNM and main-
tain the notion of Condorcet-consistency exactly. In settings like sports competitions
where pairwise comparisons of players are learned explicitly through matches played,
Condorcet-consistency is a non-negotiable desideratum. Therefore, we believe our ap-
proach is more natural in such settings.
Several authors have taken alternate approaches to understanding the power of
manipulation in tournament design. A recent line of work [Aziz et al. 2014; Kim et al.
2015; Stanton and Williams 2011] studies manipulation from the perspective of the
tournament organizer. More specifically, they study the computational complexity of
the problem of rigging a tournament: given a collection of pairwise outcomes between
players, which players can possibly win a single-elimination tournament (and how
5See [Pauly 2014] for the specific notion of strategyproofness studied.
should the tournament be seeded so that a specific player wins)? Kern and Paulusma
consider a similar question for round-robin tournaments where some matches have
been already been played [Kern and Paulusma 2004].
A large body of literature exists regarding manipulation and bribery in the context
of voting rules. For an introduction, we recommend the reader consult chapter 7 of the
handbook [Moulin et al. 2016].
1.3. Conclusions and Future Work
Our work contributes to a recent literature on incentive compatible tournament de-
sign. While most previous works insist on strong incentive properties and relaxed fair-
ness properties, such rules are inadequate for sporting events. Instead, we insist at
least that events maintain Condorcet-consistency, and aim to relax strategyproofness
as minimally as possible.
At a high level, our work suggests (similar to previous works), that single elimina-
tion brackets are desirable whenever incentive issues come into play. However, previ-
ous desiderata (such as those considered in [Altman and Kleinberg 2010]) don’t neces-
sarily rule out other tournament formats, like the Copeland rule, which is ubiquitous
in tournaments (both as a complete format and as subtournaments in a two-phase for-
mat). In comparison, our work identifies single elimination brackets (2-SNM-1/3) as
having significantly better strategic properties versus the Copeland rule (2-SNM-1).
Our work also identifies two practical suggestions when match-fixing is a concern
that aren’t explained by prior benchmarks. First, when hosting a single elimination
tournament, it might be desirable to release the exact bracket as late as possible. The
idea is that as soon as the exact bracket is known, competitors have greater incentive
to fix matches (in our model, up to three times as much), which presumably takes some
time and organization. Obviously, there are more tradeoffs at play: a later release
inconveniences athletes and fans, and (perhaps more importantly to the designers)
could negatively impact ticket sales. But our work does at least identify match-fixing
as a part of this tradeoff. Note that some Olympic events (such as Taekwondo) contest
the entire competition in a single day at a single venue, so a delayed release may
indeed be practical. We also note that a similar “fix” was applied after the 1982 World
Cup: the last two matches in each group are now played at the same time to minimize
the amount of information teams have when making potentially strategic decisions.
Additionally, our work suggests that even in the optimal tournament, hefty punish-
ments for cheaters might be necessary in order to discourage match-fixing (even with-
out taking gambling into consideration). In many sports, winning an Olympic gold can
make a career. Unfortunately, our work suggests that punishments roughly on this
order might be necessary in order to properly deter match-fixing.
Finally, we propose two directions for future work. First, while we obtain tight re-
sults for Condorcet-consistent 2-SNM-α rules, we only prove a lower bound of k-SNM-
k−1
2k−1 for Condorcet-consistent rules and k > 2. We conjecture that this is tight, but
unfortunately simulations indicate that all of the formats studied in our work do not
achieve this bound. So it is an interesting open question to design a rule that does.
Even partial results (of the form identified below) would require a new tournament
format than those considered in this work.
OPEN QUESTION 1. Does there exist a tournament rule that is Condorcet-consistent
and k-SNM- k−12k−1 for all k? What about a family of rules F such that for all k, Fk is
k-SNM- k−12k−1? What about a rule that is k-SNM-1/2 for all k?
6
6Note that k−1
2k−1 → 1/2 as k →∞.
It is also important to study what bounds are attainable in restricted versions of
our probabilistic model (e.g. if for all i, j, the probability that i beats j lies in [, 1 −
]). Realistic instances at least have some non-zero probability of an upset in every
match, but our lower bounds don’t hold in this model. So it is interesting to see if
better formats are possible.
OPEN QUESTION 2. Is a random single elimination bracket still optimal among
Condorcet-consistent rules (w.r.t. 2-SNM-α) if for all i, j, the probability that i beats
j lies in [, 1− ]? How does the optimal attainable α for Condorcet-consistent, 2-SNM-α
tournament formats change as a function of ?
2. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATION
In this section, we present notation used throughout the remainder of the paper. Where
possible, we adopt notation from [Altman and Kleinberg 2010].
Definition 2.1. A (round-robin) tournament T on n players is the set of outcomes of
the
(
n
2
)
games played between all pairs of distinct players. We write Tij = 1 if player i
beats player j and Tij = −1 otherwise. We also let Tn denote the set of tournaments on
n players.
Definition 2.2. For a subset S ⊆ [n] of players, two tournaments T and T ′ are S-
adjacent if they only differ on the outcomes of some subset of games played between
members of S. In particular, two tournaments T and T ′ are {i, j} adjacent if they only
differ in the result of the game played between player i and player j.
Definition 2.3. A tournament rule (or winner determination rule) r : Tn → ∆([n])
is a mapping from the set of tournaments on n players to probability distributions
over these n players (representing the probability we choose a given player to be the
winner). We will write ri(T ) = Pr[r(T ) = i] to denote the probability that player i wins
tournament T under rule r.
Many tournament rules, while valid by the above definition, would be ill-suited for
running an actual tournament; for example, the tournament rule which always crowns
player 1 the winner. In an attempt to restrict ourselves to ‘reasonable’ tournament
rules, we consider tournaments that obey the following two criteria.
Definition 2.4. Player i is a Condorcet winner in tournament T if player i wins their
match against all the other n− 1 players. A tournament rule r is Condorcet-consistent
if ri(T ) = 1 whenever i is a Condorcet winner in T .
Definition 2.5. A tournament rule r is monotone if, for all i, ri(T ) does not increase
when i loses a game it wins in T . That is, if i beats j in T and T and T ′ are {i, j}
adjacent, then if r is monotone, ri(T ) ≥ ri(T ′).
Intuitively, this first criterion requires us to award the prize to the winner in the case
of a clear winner (hence making the tournament a contest of skill), and the second
criterion makes it so that players have an incentive to win their games. There are
various other criteria one might wish a tournament rule to satisfy; many can be found
in [Altman and Kleinberg 2010].
In this paper, we consider the scenario where certain coalitions of players attempt
to increase the overall chance of one of them winning by manipulating the outcomes
of matches within players of the coalition. The simplest case of this is in the case of
coalitions of size 2, where player j might throw their match to player i. If T is the
original tournament and T ′ is the manipulated tournament where j loses to i, then
player i gains ri(T ′)− ri(T ) from the manipulation, and player j loses rj(T )− rj(T ′) (in
terms of probability of winning). Therefore, as long as ri(T ′)− ri(T ) > rj(T )− rj(T ′), it
will be in the players’ interest to manipulate. Equivalently, if ri(T ′) + rj(T ′) > ri(T ) +
rj(T ) (i.e., the probability either player i or j wins increases upon throwing the match),
there is incentive for i and j to manipulate.
Ideally, we would like to choose a tournament rule so that, regardless of the tour-
nament, there will be no incentive to perform manipulations of the above sort. This is
encapsulated in the following definition from [Altman and Kleinberg 2010].
Definition 2.6. A tournament rule r is 2-strongly non-manipulable (2-SNM) if, for
all pairs of {i, j}-adjacent tournaments T and T ′, ri(T ) + rj(T ) = ri(T ′) + rj(T ′).
Unfortunately, no tournament rules exist that are simultaneously Condorcet-
consistent and 2-strongly non-manipulable (this is shown in [Altman and Kleinberg
2010] and also follows from our lower bound in Section 3.1). As tournament designers,
one way around this obstacle is to discourage manipulation. This discouragement can
take many forms, both explicit (if players are caught fixing matches, they are disqual-
ified/fined) and implicit (it is logistically hard to fix matches, it is unsportsmanlike).
So the focus of this paper is to quantify how manipulable certain tournament formats
are (i.e. how much can teams possibly gain by fixing matches), the idea being that it is
easier to discourage manipulation in tournaments that are less manipulable.
Definition 2.7. A tournament rule r is 2-strongly non-manipulable at probability α
(2-SNM-α) if, for all i and j and pairs of {i, j}-adjacent tournaments T and T ′, ri(T ′) +
rj(T
′)− ri(T )− rj(T ) ≤ α.
It is straightforward to generalize this definition to larger coalitions of colluding
players.
Definition 2.8. A tournament rule r is k-strongly non-manipulable at probability α
(k-SNM-α) if, for all subsets S of players of size at most k, for all pairs of S-adjacent
tournaments T and T ′,
∑
i∈S ri(T
′)−∑i∈S ri(T ) ≤ α.
2.1. The Random Single-Elimination Bracket Rule
Our main result concerns a specific tournament rule we call the random single-
elimination bracket rule. This rule can be defined formally as follows.
Definition 2.9. A single-elimination bracket (or bracket, for short) B on n = 2h play-
ers is a complete binary tree of height h whose leaves are labelled with some permuta-
tion of the n players. The outcome of a bracket B under a tournament T is the labelling
of internal nodes of B where each node is labelled by the winner of its two children un-
der T . The winner of B under T is the label of the root of B under this labelling.
Definition 2.10. The random single-elimination bracket rule r is a tournament rule
on n = 2h players where ri(T ) is the probability player i is the winner of B under T
when B is chosen uniformly at random from the set of n! possible brackets.
If n is not a power of 2, we define the random single-elimination bracket rule on
n players by introducing 2dlog2 ne − n dummy players who lose to all of the existing n
players.
It is straightforward to check that the random single-elimination bracket rule is
both Condorcet-consistent and monotone. Our main result (Theorem 3.3) shows that
in addition to these properties, the random single-elimination bracket rule is 2-SNM-
1/3 (which is the best possible, by Theorem 3.1).
We give some examples of other common tournament rules in Section 3.4. While
many of these rules are both Condorcet-consistent and monotone, we do not know of
any which are additionally 2-SNM-1/3.
Fig. 1. A tournament which attains the lower bound of α = 1/3 for all tournament rules.
3. MAIN RESULT
3.1. Lower bounds for k-SNM-α
We begin by showing that no tournament rule is 2-SNM-α for α < 1/3. A similar
theorem appears as Proposition 17 in [Altman and Kleinberg 2010] (which states that
α = 0 is impossible).
THEOREM 3.1. There is no Condorcet-consistent tournament rule on n players (for
n ≥ 3) that is 2-SNM-α for α < 13 .
PROOF. Consider the tournament T on three players A, B, and C where A beats
B, B beats C, and C beats A (illustrated in Figure 1). . Note that, while this tourna-
ment has no Condorcet winner, changing the result of any of the three games results
in a Condorcet winner. For example, if A bribes C to lose to A, then A becomes the
Condorcet winner.
If we have a tournament rule r that is 2-SNM-α, then combining this with the above
fact gives rise to the following three inequalities.
rA(T ) + rB(T ) ≥ 1− α
rB(T ) + rC(T ) ≥ 1− α
rC(T ) + rA(T ) ≥ 1− α
Together these imply rA(T )+rB(T )+rC(T ) ≥ 32 (1−α). But rA(T )+rB(T )+rC(T ) = 1;
it follows that α ≥ 13 , as desired.
We can extend this counterexample to n > 3 players by introducing n − 3 dummy
players who all lose to A, B, and C; the argument above continues to hold.
We can use similar logic to prove lower bounds for the more general case of k-SNM-α.
THEOREM 3.2. There is no Condorcet-consistent tournament rule on n players (for
n ≥ 2k − 1) that is k-SNM-α for α < k−12k−1 .
PROOF. Consider the following tournament T on the 2k − 1 players labelled 1
through 2k−1. Each player i wins their match versus the k−1 players i+1, i+2, . . . , i+
(k− 1), and loses their match versus the k− 1 players i− 1, i− 2, . . . , i− (k− 1) (indices
taken modulo 2k − 1). Note that the coalition of players Si = {i, i − 1, . . . , i − (k − 1)}
of size k can cause i to become a Condorcet winner if all players in the coalition agree
to lose their games with i. If we have a tournament rule r that is k-SNM-α, then this
implies the following 2k − 1 inequalities (one for each i ∈ [2k − 1]):∑
j∈Si
rj(T ) ≥ 1− α (1)
Summing these 2k − 1 inequalities, we obtain
k
2k−1∑
j=1
rj(T ) ≥ (2k − 1)(1− α) (2)
Since
∑2k−1
j=1 rj(T ) ≤ 1, this implies that α ≥ k−12k−1 , as desired. Again, it is possible
to extend this example to any number of players n ≥ 2k − 1 by introducing dummy
players who lose to all 2k − 1 of the above players.
3.2. Random single elimination brackets are 2-SNM-1/3
We now show that the random single elimination bracket rule is optimal against coali-
tions of size 2. The proof idea is simple; for every bracket B that contributes to the
incentive to manipulate ri(T ′) + rj(T ′)− ri(T )− rj(T ) we will show that there are two
that do not (in other words, for every scenario where team i benefits from the manipu-
lation, there exist two other scenarios where the maniuplation does not benefit either
team).
THEOREM 3.3. The random single elimination bracket rule is 2-SNM-1/3.
PROOF. Let B be the set of n! different possible brackets amongst the n players. For
a given tournament T and a given player i, write 1(B, T, i) to represent the indicator
variable which is 1 if i wins bracket B under the outcomes in T and 0 otherwise. Then
we can write
ri(T ) =
1
|B|
∑
B∈B
1(B, T, i).
Assume i loses to j in T . Then, if we let T ′ be the tournament that is {i, j} adjacent
to T , we can write the increase in utility resulting from j throwing to i
1
|B|
∑
B∈B
(1(B, T ′, i) + 1(B, T ′, j)− 1(B, T, i)− 1(B, T, j)) . (3)
Our goal is to show that this sum is at most 1/3. Now, note that if i does not end up
playing j in bracket B under T , i also does not play j in B under T ′ (and vice versa).
In these brackets, 1(B, T ′, i) = 1(B, T, i) and 1(B, T ′, j) = 1(B, T, j), so these brackets
contribute nothing to the sum in Equation 3. On the other hand, in a bracket B where
i does play j, we are guaranteed that 1(B, T, i) = 0 and 1(B, T ′, j) = 0 (since i loses to
j in T and j loses to i in T ′). Therefore, letting Bij be the subset of B of brackets where
i meets j, we can rewrite Equation 3 as
1
|B|
∑
B∈Bij
(1(B, T ′, i)− 1(B, T, j)) .
Since 1(B, T ′, i) ≤ 1, this is at most
Fig. 2. An example of a bad bracket B.
1
|B|
∑
B∈Bij
(1− 1(B, T, j)) .
This final sum counts exactly the number of brackets B where i and j meet (under
T , so j beats i) but j does not win the tournament. Call such brackets bad, and call the
remaining brackets good. We will exhibit two injective mappings σi and σj from bad
brackets to good brackets such that the ranges of σi and σj are disjoint. This implies
that there are at least twice as many good brackets as bad brackets, and thus that the
sum above is at most 1/3, completing the proof.
For both mappings, we will need the following terminology. Consider a bad bracket
B, and consider the path from j up to the root of this tree. The nodes of this path are
labelled by players that j would face if they got that far. More specifically, j has some
opponent in the first round. Should j win, j would face some opponent in the second
round, then the third round, etc. all the way to the finals, and these opponents do not
depend on the outcomes of any of j’s matches. Then since B is a bad bracket, j does
not win, and at least one of the players on this path can beat j. Choose the latest such
player (i.e. the closest to the root) and call this player k. Note that k might not be the
player that knocks j out of the tournament (that is the first player along this path who
would beat j).
Suppose that i and j meet at height h of the bracket (i.e. in the hth round). Let
Bi, Bj , Bk be the subtrees of height h that contain i, j, and k respectively. An example
is shown in Figure 2.
We first describe the simpler of the two maps, σi. Define σi(B) by swapping the
subtrees Bi and Bk as shown in Figure 3. In this bracket j will lose to k before ever
meeting i, so σi(B) is good. Moreover σi is injective since we can construct its inverse.
In σi(B), j certainly would lose to k at height h before reaching i. Furthermore, because
we didn’t change Bj at all, j still wins all of its first h − 1 matches and makes it to k
(because we started from a B where j makes it to i at height h). So we can identify k
as the first player who beats j in σi(B), learn the height h, and undo the swap of Bk
and Bi.
We now describe the second map, σj . To construct σj(B), begin by swapping the
subtrees Bj and Bk (see Figure 4). Note that the bracket formed in this way is good;
since we chose k to be the latest player on j’s path to victory that can beat j, if j
meets i, j will also beat all subsequent players and win the tournament (note that it
is of course possible that j doesn’t even make it to i, in which case σj(B) is still good.
But it is clear that if j meets i, then j will win the tournament, so σj(B) is good in
Fig. 3. σi(B).
either case). Unfortunately, this map as stated is not injective; in particular, we cannot
recover the height h to undo the swap as in the previous case.
The only reason we cannot uniquely identify k in the same way as when we invert
σi is that i might meet some player k′ at height h′ < h in Bi who also could beat j. So,
intuitively, we would like to swap such players out with players who lose to j. Since j
beats all of its opponents in Bj , Bj is an ample source of such players. We will therefore
perform some additional ‘subswap’ operations, swapping subtrees of Bj and Bk so as
to uniquely identify k as the first player i meets in σj(B) who can beat j.
Specifically, for 0 ≤ h′ < h, let a(h′) be the opponent i plays at height h′ in Bi, and let
Bi(h
′) be the subtree of Bi with root a(h′) (note that the player that i meets at height
h′ is the root of a subtree of height h′ − 1, and that all these subtrees are disjoint).
Similarly, let b(h′) be the opponent j plays at height h′ in Bj , and let Bj(h′) be the
subtree of Bj with root b(h′). To construct σj(B) from B, first swap Bj and Bk. Then for
each h′ ∈ [0, h) such that a(h′) would beat j, swap the subtrees Bi(h′) and Bj(h′). See
Figure 5 for an illustration of a subswap operation.
Note that σj(B) is still good; it is still the case that if j meets i, j will beat all sub-
sequent players (all we have done in that part of the bracket is perhaps alter whether
or not j will indeed meet i). On the other hand, since j makes it to height h in Bj , j
can beat player b(h′) for all h′, so k is now the first player i would encounter in σj(B)
who can beat j. From this, we can recover k and thus h, and undo the swap of Bi and
Bj . To undo the subswaps, observe that because we started with a bad bracket B, that
j must have beaten all opponents it faces in the first h rounds. Since all opponents on
j’s path who beat j at height less than h were necessarily put there by our subswap
operations, we can just find all such opponents and swap them back out. This process
inverts σj , thus proving that σj is injective.
Finally, note that in σi(B), k must play j before either plays i, whereas in σj(B), k
must play i before either plays j. Therefore the ranges of σi and σj are disjoint, and
this completes the proof.
For the reader aiming to understand our coupling argument better, Appendix A con-
tains some specific examples.
3.3. Extension to randomized outcomes
Thus far we have been assuming that all match results are deterministic and known to
the players in advance. Of course, this is not true in general; in real life, the outcomes of
games are inherently unpredictable. It is perhaps imaginable that this unpredictabil-
ity could increase the incentive to manipulate. In this section we show that this is
not the case; a simple application of linearity of expectation shows that results about
Fig. 4. σj(B).
Fig. 5. Subswap operation for σj .
deterministic tournaments still hold for their randomized counterparts. We begin by
defining a randomized tournament as follows.
Definition 3.4. A randomized tournament T is a random variable whose values
range over (deterministic) tournaments T . As shorthand, we will write PT (T ) to repre-
sent the probability that T = T .
Note that this definition accounts for the most straightforward generalization of
tournament outcomes from deterministic to randomized, where for each match be-
tween players i and j we assign a probability pij to the probability that i beats j. This
definition further allows for the possibility of correlation between matches (e.g., with
some probability player i has a good day and wins all his matches, and with some
probability he has a bad day and loses all his matches).
Manipulations in this randomized model are similar to manipulations in the deter-
ministic model in that they effectively force the result of a match to a win or a loss.
Formally, let σij(T ) for a (deterministic) tournament T be the tournament formed by T
but where i beats j (if i beats j in T , then σij(T ) = T ). A tournament rule r is 2-SNM-α
if for all i and j,
ET [ri(σij(T )) + rj(σij(T ))− ri(T )− rj(T )] ≤ α (4)
We then have the following theorem:
THEOREM 3.5. If a rule r is 2-SNM-α in the deterministic tournament model, it is
also 2-SNM-α in the randomized tournament model.
PROOF. Note that we can write the expectation in Equation 4 as∑
T
PT (T ) (ri(σij(T )) + rj(σij(T ))− ri(T )− rj(T ))
If r is 2-SNM-α for deterministic tournaments, then each term in this sum is at
most PT (T )α. It follows that this sum is at most α, and therefore r is also 2-SNM-α for
randomized tournaments.
It is straightforward to generalize the above definitions and result to the case of
k-SNM-α.
3.4. Other tournament formats
Finally, there are many other tournament formats that are either used in practice or
have been previously studied. In this section we show that many of these formats are
more susceptible to manipulation than the random single elimination bracket rule; in
particular, all of the following formats are at best 2-SNM-1/2.
By far the most common tournament rule for round robin tournaments is some
variant of a ‘scoring’ rule, where the winner is the player who has won the most
games (with ties broken in some fashion if multiple players have won the same max-
imum number of games). In voting theory, this rule is often called Copeland’s rule, or
Copeland’s method [Copeland 1951].
Definition 3.6. A tournament rule r is a Copeland rule if the winner is always se-
lected from the set of players with the maximum number of wins.
We begin by showing that no Copeland rule can be 2-SNM-α for any α < 1 (regard-
less of how the rule breaks ties).
THEOREM 3.7. There is no Copeland rule on n players that is 2-SNM-α for α <
1− 2n−1 .
PROOF. Assume to begin that n = 2k + 1 is odd, and let r be a Copeland rule on n
players. Let T be the tournament where each player i beats the k players {i + 1, i +
2, . . . , i+ k} but loses to the k players {i− 1, i− 2, . . . , i− k}, with indices taken modulo
n (similar to the tournament in the proof of Theorem 3.2).
Since
∑n
i=1 ri(T ) = 1, there must be some i such that ri−1(T ) + ri(T ) ≤ 2n . On the
other hand, if player i − 1 throws their match to player i, then player i becomes the
unique Copeland winner (winning k+ 1 games) and ri(T ′) = 1. It follows that, for such
a rule, if r is 2-SNM-α, then α ≥ 1− 2n .
If n is even, then we can embed the above example for n− 1 by assigning one player
to be a dummy player that loses to all teams. This immediately implies α ≥ 1− 2n−1 in
this case.
In [Altman and Kleinberg 2010], Altman and Kleinberg provide three examples of
tournament rules that are Condorcet-consistent and monotone: the top cycle rule, the
iterative Condorcet rule, and the randomized voting caterpillar rule. We prove lower
bounds on α for each of these in turn. Interestingly, the same tournament provides all
three lower bounds.
Definition 3.8. The superman-kryptonite tournament on n players has i beat j
whenever i < j, except that player n beats player 1. That is, player 1 beats everyone
except for player n, who loses to everyone except for player 1.
Now we show that the superman-kryptonite tournament provides lower bounds
against the tournament rules considered in [Altman and Kleinberg 2010].
Definition 3.9. The top cycle of a tournament T is the minimal set of players who
beat all other players. The top cycle rule is a tournament rule which assigns the winner
to be a uniformly random element of this set.
THEOREM 3.10. The top cycle rule on n players is not 2-SNM-α for any α < 1− 2n .
PROOF. Let T be the superman-kryptonite tournament on n players. The top cycle
in T contains all the players, so r1(T ) + rn(T ) = 2n . However, if player n throws their
match to player 1, player 1 becomes a Condorcet winner and r1(T ′) = 1. It follows that
α ≥ 1− 2n .
Definition 3.11. The iterative Condorcet rule is a tournament rule that uniformly
removes players at random until there is a Condorcet winner, and then assigns that
player to be the winner.
THEOREM 3.12. The iterative Condorcet rule on n players is not 2-SNM-α for any
α < 12 − 1n(n−1) .
PROOF. Let T be the superman-kryptonite tournament on n players. Note that no
Condorcet winner will appear until either player 1 is removed, player n is removed, or
all other n − 2 players are removed. If all the other n − 2 players are removed before
players 1 or n (which occurs with probability 2n(n−1) ), then player n wins. If this does
not happen and player n is removed before player 1 (which occurs with probability
1
2
(
1− 2n(n−1)
)
= 12 − 1n(n−1) ), then player 1 becomes the Condorcet winner and wins.
Otherwise, player 1 will be removed before player n, while some players in 2 through
n−1 remain, and one of them will become the Condorcet winner (the remaining player
in {2, . . . , n−1}with lowest index). It follows that r1(T ) = 12− 1n(n−1) and rn(T ) = 2n(n−1) ,
so r1(T ) + rn(T ) = 12 +
1
n(n−1) .
On the other hand, if player n throws their match to player 1, then again player 1
becomes a Condorcet winner and r1(T ′) = 1. It follows that α ≥ 12 − 1n(n−1) .
Definition 3.13. The randomized voting caterpillar rule is a tournament rule which
chooses a winner as follows. Choose a random permutation pi of [n]. Start by matching
pi(1) and pi(2), and choose a winner according to T . Then for all i ≥ 3 match pi(i) with
the winner of the most recent match. The player that wins the last match (against
pi(n)) is declared the winner.
THEOREM 3.14. The randomized voting caterpillar rule on n players is not 2-SNM-
α for any α < 12 − n−3n(n−1) .
PROOF. Let T be the superman-kryptonite tournament on n players. The only way
player 1 loses is if either player n occurs later in pi than player 1 (which happens with
probability 12 ) or if pi(n) = 1 and pi(1) = 2 and they play in the first round (which
happens with probability 1n(n−1) ). The only way player n can win is if pi(n) = n (i.e.,
they only play the very last game), in which case they will play player 1 and win (this
happens with probability 1n ). It follows that r1(T ) =
1
2 − 1n(n−1) and rn(T ) = 1n , so
r1(T ) + rn(T ) =
1
2 +
n−2
n(n−1) .
On the other hand, if player n throws their match to player 1, then again player 1
becomes a Condorcet winner and r1(T ′) = 1. It follows that α ≥ 12 − n−2n(n−1) .
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A. MORE DETAILS ON OUR COUPLING ARGUMENT
In this appendix we present examples of bracket transformations. Recall that our
transformations took as input any “bad” bracket, where player i eventually meets
player j, and player j will lose to some player k in the future if she advances past
i (and k is the latest such player). The players benefit from manipulating these brack-
ets. We transformed them into “good” brackets, where either player j is eliminated
before even meeting player i, or where player j would be the champion conditioned on
getting past i. The players have no incentive to manipulate these brackets.
We designed two injective transformations with disjoint images, σi and σj . σi was
more straight-forward, but we include an example below anyway. σj was more complex.
We include below an example showing that the complexity is necessary, and then an
example of σj . All figures are at the end.
A.1. Example of the transformation σi(B).
Recall that σi essentially swaps the sub-brackets rooted at i and k. See Section 3.2 for
a formal description.
Consider the partial bracket B1 shown in Figure 6. Then, applying the transforma-
tion σi(B1) as described in our paper will yield the bracket B′1 shown in Figure 7. Note
that this mapping is injective: by examining σi(B), we see exactly where j is elimi-
nated, and conclude that this must be where i met j in the original B.
A.2. Counterexample to a naive σj(B).
We could try using the same ideas in σi for σj : simply swap the subtrees rooted at k
and j. Unfortunately, this mapping is not injective.
Consider the two brackets B3, B4 shown in Figure 8. Then applying this naive trans-
formation will map these brackets to the same bracket (see Figure 9), showing that the
mapping may not be injective. This motivates the need for the more involved transfor-
mation σj from Section 3.2.
Specifically, observe that in B3, i meets j in round 2, so the depth-2 subtree rooted at
k would get swapped with the depth-2 subtree rooted at j. In B4, i meets j in round 1,
so the single node i1 would get swapped with the single node j. It is easy, but tedious,
to complete this into a full tournament/bracket.
A.3. Example of the transformation σj(B).
Essentially, the problem with the naive transformation is that it’s hard to recover
where i met j in the original B just from the naive σj(B). This is because maybe on
its path to j, i met many other competitors who also would have beaten j, in addition
to the k we swap in from the mapping. Our more involved transformation fixes this by
additionally swapping all such competitors out of the subtree below i, so we can again
recover where i met j in the original B.
Consider the partial bracket B2 shown in Figure 10 and assume that in the tourna-
ment in case i2 would beat j. Then, applying the transformation σj(B2) as described in
our paper will yield the bracket B′2 shown in 11.
Note that this mapping is injective! First, we can recover where i met j in the origi-
nal B by looking at where i first encounters someone who would beat j in σj(B). Once
we learn this, we also know that in the original B, j actually advanced this far in the
tournament to meet i, so we know exactly which subtrees we need to un-swap with
subtrees of i.
Fig. 6. A partial bracket B1.
Fig. 7. σi(B1).
Fig. 8. Two partial brackets B3, B4.
Fig. 9. Swapping the subtrees corresponding to j, k in both brackets above yields this bracket.
Fig. 10. A partial bracket B2.
Fig. 11. σj(B2).
